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Abstract

During the British Empire’s colonial occupation of Kenya, which began in 1895, a new
sense of Kenyan nationalism emerged. Between 1952 and 1956, the combined Kenyan tribes—
united for the first time and calling themselves the Mau Mau—launched a violent guerilla war
against the occupying British forces. Militarily, the Kenyans were no match for the seasoned
soldiers, yet the rebellion became a significant cause of the ultimate British decision to withdraw
from the Kenyan colony. Policy makers in the British metropole—the political and cultural
center of the British Empire—grew concerned that any reprisal against further Mau Mau
insurgent action would lead to socio-political repercussion that the dwindling empire could ill
afford. By 1954, in response to their own political fears, the colonial government, in full
cooperation with the Home Office, increased the repression of the native Kenyans in an attempt
to cover up the abuses the Kenyans suffered under British rule. It was not until 2005 that
investigative historians uncovered evidence of these abuses, and by 2011 thousands of
documents offered incriminating evidence of both colonial abuse and the complicity of the
central government. This paper examines how fears of socio-political repercussions over
colonial abuses in Kenya led directly to the decision to decolonize. At the core of this anxiety
lay the Mau Mau rebellion and the British governments attempts to obfuscate the true nature of
the insurrection.

4
Introduction
British forces faced little resistance in their initial efforts to colonize the nation of Kenya
in 1895. European governments had been carving up the continent of Africa for decades and had
become adept at managing native populations. The colonial governors in Kenya kept relative
peace through the mid-twentieth century. In response to growing dissatisfaction with imperial
rule, Kenyans, led by the large Kikuyu tribe, staged a violent revolt against the British colonists
in 1952. 1 The insurgency was known as the Mau Mau rebellion, so named after the title given
to the Kenyan freedom fighters by British soldiers. British de-colonization occurred twelve
years later in 1964, after more than a decade of guerilla warfare. During this time, the once
tribally oriented natives gained a sense of national identity. This nationalistic identity, born
under imperial subjugation, was synonymous with the insurrectionist Mau Mau warriors in the
minds of the British government. Their nationalist ideas represented a substantial threat to the
stability of the Kenyan colony. The rebellion also renewed interest in Kenya in the metropole
and abroad as allegations of mistreatment caused embarrassment to both colonial officials and
those in the British Home Office. The insurrection did not defeat Britain militarily, yet the fear
of potential repercussions that further violence might precipitate did influence policy in Britain. 2
Kenyan independence is a direct result of British anxiety that socio/geopolitical repercussions—
including the loss of Britain’s “special relationship” with the United States in a modern era of

1

Caroline Elkins, Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain's Gulag in Kenya
(New York: Henry and Holt, 2005), 338.
2

Colonial Secretary Ian Macleod claimed suffrage as a necessity as far back as 1960 but
with little result other than exciting the Kenyan peoples and putting on a show for political
motivations.

5
multiculturalism, and U.S. anxieties that communistic ideology would infiltrate a weak Africa—
would prove substantial, if not disastrous, should hostilities with the Mau Mau resume.
Kenya maintains an important position in the discussion of African decolonization. It
was, along with Uganda, the earliest African colony to win its freedom from the British Empire
by way of military and nationalistic uprisings.3 The cascade of decolonization that followed was
controlled by a British Parliament that recognized the difficulties of maintaining colonial
possessions in the face of metropolitan, international, and colonial pressures. By 1980, the
British Empire had relinquished all colonial holdings in Africa. The Mau Mau and other colonial
freedom fighters created an environment that destabilized British relations at home and abroad
leading to the eventual dissolution of a nearly four-hundred-year old empire.
The British initially entered Kenya in
1895 to create a rail system from the Port of
Mombasa directly to Lake Victoria, cementing
their power and access to raw materials in the
region. During the expedition, Britons
recognized a favorable climate and rich
agricultural soil. The early colonists quickly
ousted the native population from the best
lands in the “White Highlands.” The Kikuyu
tribe, the largest in Kenya, was taxed by the
Figure 1Map of Kenya: circa 1920, WWW.Worldhistory.Biz

British government in order to provide early
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settlers a means of obtaining labor.4 The Kenyans had to work for the British in order to pay the
new taxes. Control of the populace through the combination of force and manipulative measures
followed only after the Kenyan colony had been reworked into a British-style bureaucratic
system, placing the Kenyans, from the British perspective, under legal colonial authority.5
From the moment the British appropriated power from the native population in 1920, the
history of Kenya was written by government documents. Examination of these documents, later
used to condemn the colonial system, shows acceptance of physical violence as useful in
controlling the native populace as well as knowledge of colonial abuses in the highest level of
government.6 However, prior to the additional news coverage provided by the Mau Mau
rebellion, British societies understanding of Kenya and Kenyans was shaped by pulp and
propaganda. Popular culture reacted to tales of savage natives terrorizing British colonists, thus
allowing for popular magazines to titillate and alarm their thousands of subscribers with
fabricated stories and articles about anachronistic native persons.7 Although these articles were
made for entertainment, the argument must be made that the social consciousness must have
accepted them on some level, as no outcry in favor of the Kenyans had been recorded at this
time. More serious articles were printed that displayed a decidedly racist and Anglo-centric
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7
perspective that Kenyans were “incapable of self-rule” and should be grateful for the
intervention of the British who had “it in their nature to rule over others.”8
Kenyans eventually rebelled against their serf-like status which led to severe restrictions
and brutal treatment of any captive “insurgents.”9 The mounting public and international
pressures, which Prime Minister Harold McMillan (1957-63) had been able to control before the
rebellion, led to the belief that Kenya was no longer a viable colonial acquisition. McMillan—
under pressure from the United States, reeling from the Suez debacle and preparing to run for reelection—sought to end the debate by agreeing to decolonize Kenya.10 Although a momentous
political movement, decolonization did little to create a revisionist history of colonial Africa for
several decades.
Historiography
The traditional British history of Kenya, controlled by the colonial government, is replete
with propaganda and misinformation. The efforts of modern historians have exposed these
misconceptions to acknowledge the native population as freedom fighters, protecting their lands
from oppressive foreign occupiers. Through the investigative work of scholars such as Caroline
Elkins, the history of British Kenya has undergone remarkable revision. Elkins leads this
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revisionist historiography with her pursuit of secret British government documents, interviews
with native Kenyans, and her defense of her groundbreaking Imperial Reckoning.
The history of colonial Kenya was difficult to navigate before Elkins’ discoveries and
revisionist work. Earlier historians of the Kenyan people were stymied by a lack of
documentation. Further, disparate languages, customs and cultures made a unified history of the
population impossible as perspectives on the Kenyan culture were irredeemably dissimilar even
within the native population.11 Education in Kenya: A Historical Study by James R. Sheffield
displays another common theme: a (possibly) unconscious perspective of a benign colonial
government’s attempts to educate and civilize the tribal natives. These early attempts at
understanding the societal nature of the Kenyans were also generally from a pre-postcolonial
academic perspective. They sought to understand rebellion and colonial rule but without an antiimperial bias that may have been unpopular at home. It should also be noted that Nairobi, the
capitol of Kenya, where many early historians conducted their research, was well-developed and
comfortable by European standards. This city of European privilege would have housed
wealthy, colonial landowners who extolled the virtues of Kenyan colonialism, doing much to
allay any scandal that close research may bring to bear.
In 1998, Caroline Elkins discovered a folder marked “secret” in the British archives that
detailed Hola camp superintendent Terence Gavaghan’s “dilution technique” of torture.12 Hola
camp was created by the colonial governor to house Mau Mau detainees and was run by
commandant Gavaghan. To further substantiate the evidence that she discovered, Elkins went to
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Kenya and conducted extensive interviews. She presented her findings in her 2005 book
Imperial Reckoning in which she detailed the detention of 1.5 million Kenyans and the
systematic torture of prisoners by colonial powers. Elkins’ discovery spurred on a new
movement in the legacy of Kenya’s history. Other authors, notably David Anderson, published
similar, though less radical, revisionist works the same year.
Elkins came under immediate and intense scrutiny by critical academics such as Bethwell
Ogot, a senior Kenyan historian, who published a searing rebuttal of her claims in the Journal of
African History.13 As Elkins’ book is primarily supported by personal anecdotes made by the
survivors she interviewed, he accused her of sensationalism and outright fabrication. He argued
her numbers as well as her facts to be significantly overestimated. Elkins’ extensive reference
section is significantly shorter when personal interviews are removed. Many of the interviews
are titled “anonymous” making her case that much harder to substantiate. However, the
corroborating, although less antagonistic, works by Anderson and Kenyan native Mugo Gatheru
were enough to spur surviving victims of Hola to sue the British government for recognition of
colonial abuses and restitution for their suffering.14 Gatheru was raised in colonial Kenya and
offered a first-hand account of colonial atrocities from a native perspective. He would later
receive his education in law in England, making him an educated Kenyan voice that was hard for
British political leaders to ignore. For his part, Anderson provided examples of how the British
government used propaganda to quell social unrest in Kenya. He asserts powers in colonial
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Kenya and the British metropole, including the Prime Minister, were complicit in the cover up of
abuse in the colony.15
During the investigation leading up to the 2011 lawsuit, documents previously believed
destroyed were re-discovered. They not only revealed systematic abuse and torture, but implied
the complicity of the British government.16 Elkins, Anderson, and Gatheru were vindicated in
their revisionist theories of the colonial abuses in Kenya, especially in regards to the Mau Mau
and Hola detention center. The histories, for the moment, were disseminated by the press as a
matter of global interest in the litigation against the British Government.
The release of many of the documents—300 boxes have been released but 13 are still
“missing”—spurred other academic authors to renew the investigation into colonial Kenya as
well as its inclusion into discussions of imperial injustice. Gillian Fazan sought to understand
the plight of Kenyans’ public health and how global conflict affected social and political change
in Kenya in Colonial Kenya Observed.17 Micki Hudson-Koster published an amazing treatise on
the Mau Mau titled The Making of Mau Mau: The Power of the Oath; it provides a fascinating
insight into the Kenyan freedom fighters: who they were, what they believed and how they lived
during the occupation.18 The Mau Mau had turned a historical corner as they were no longer
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seen simply as victims of imperial might, but were recognized as a unique culture who added
depth and value to the global story of which they were a part.
Currently, the Mau Mau are in the public sphere once more as more victims seek
restitution from the British government in an ongoing lawsuit. The current lawsuit seeks
compensation for emotional trauma experienced during the occupation.19 The history of the Mau
Mau is not yet complete: the disclosure of the missing file boxes, the satisfactory resolution of
the court process and having their history, both pre and post-colonial, fully documented will do
much to conclude the revisionist histories published by historians from 2005 onward.
Although treated individually by revisionist historians, the causation of decolonization
due to (A.) fear of a Mau Mau resurgence causing political sanctions, combined with (B.) United
States’ interference, based on anti-communist ideology, to create an intense anxiety in the British
metropole. This dual causation has not been sufficiently examined and is the subject of this
paper.

A History of Kenya
Pre-colonial Kenya was populated by diverse tribes that competed for grazing and
agricultural territory and water; tribes were too small to create a centralized governmental system
but were patriarchal in nature. Several tribes would often merge to create a clan which
facilitated the growth and safety of individual nuclear families while ensuring genetic health.
While some Kenyan natives were herders and farmers, fishing and hunter-gatherer tribes were
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predominant. Although some Arab settlers and European explorers had made contact with
various Kenyan tribes, there seems to have been little cultural exchange before the nineteenth
century.20
In 1895, British extended rule to include Kenya as the East Africa Protectorate. The
original plan was simply to facilitate construction of a rail line from the port of Mombasa
directly to Lake Victoria, creating a strategic link with British-held Uganda. During the
construction of the rail line, British officials discovered a climate they found agreeable and
recognized the agricultural promise of the region—the fertile, nutrient-rich soil being especially
suitable for the production of tea and coffee. 21 The earliest colonists quickly secured the most
profitable lands in the Rift Valley and Highlands for white usage only. 22 Trade from coffee was
an immediate financial success, made possible by the labor of the reluctant native population. 23
Railroad construction may have caused the initial bitterness between the British and Kenyans,
but it was the unfair land use restrictions which resulted in violent protests by the native tribes.
British colonial police responded to the violence with swift, military brutality; rather than cowing
the Kenyans, this action unified the tribes in an anti-imperialistic attitude.24
At the conclusion of the First World War, Kenya received a massive influx of white
settlers which resulted in a deepening sense of national identity among tribes which united
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against a common threat. 25 Coupled with this new-found sense of unity came a willingness
among Kenyans to use violence to reclaim their land. By 1920, more than 25,000 British
colonists, mostly farmers, had relocated to Kenya. 26 In order to make space for the incoming
colonists, British forces removed more than one million Kenyans from their homes and stripped
them of their lands. The British government continued to take native Kenyan land during the
Second World War to house a military base while Kenyans provided nearly 100,000 native
troops to the British war effort. These returning troops, having experienced life outside of
Africa, came home with firmly entrenched concepts of nationalism, self-rule and modernization.
In 1947, reacting to increasing pressures and abuses of white Europeans, Kenyans elected Jomo
Kenyatta to lead the Kenyan African Union (KAU). The KAU represented the united,
nationalistic front of Kenyans tribes who demanded representation in government as well as the
return of their lands. 27
These new nationalistic perspectives facilitated the unification and cooperation of several
tribes. The result was an ideologically motivated, militaristic band of freedom fighters whose
sole intention was to overthrow the small minority of white settlers. 28 The colonial police
stationed in Kenya, recognizing the disproportionate numbers, the unfamiliar and unforgiving
terrain, as well as following a political agenda that did not allow for negotiation, desperately
pleaded for military intervention. British policy makers were slow to respond to such requests,
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believing the Kenyans to be inferior “savages” incapable of becoming a serious military threat.
Further, British Parliament did not recognize the legitimacy of the Kenyan political party the
Kikuyu Central Association (KCA)—predecessor to the Kenyan African Union (KAU)—thereby
portraying these “Mau Mau” as terrorists rather than political insurgents. 29 Creating the fiction
of rebellious savages with no political motivations reassured policy makers and the public alike
that the insurrection would quickly be quelled and that Britain was acting within moral
boundaries.
While there is no agreement on the etymological origins of the moniker Mau Mau, there
is one theory that seems the most plausible. A Kikuyu prisoner was being interrogated by the
colonial magistrate in 1950 and his response was “Maundo maumau nderiruo ndikoige,” which
translates as “Those things I was told not to reveal.”30 The term Mau Mau became the name
used by the British, historians and the Kenyan rebels themselves.
The Mau Mau should not be seen as a political, religious or cultural movement. Rather,
the rebels who came from the forty tribes of Kenya to enlist in the Mau Mau movement
symbolized a nationalistic sensibility learned from shared experiences with the colonists.
Perhaps one reason the Mau Mau were continuously underestimated in the metropole was the
Kenyan ability to adhere to tribal loyalties concurrently with those of the rebellion. This divided
aspect, as seen from the outside, would confuse colonial officials as to the true number of
insurgents as well as the depth of their loyalty. Further adding to this sense of British overconfidence was the idea that the Mau Mau were a rag tag band of jungle warriors whereas, in
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truth, they followed commands from central leadership in Nairobi that coordinated military
action.31 As confidence and respect grew among the tribes of Kenya, more and more flocked to
the Mau Mau cause. In order to create a sense of unity, ancient tribal traditions of oathing
ceremonies were practiced.
The Oath itself was a secret, sacred right that was morally and spiritually binding. There
are no records of the oath but several of its aspects have been pieced together. They are thought
to include “If I know of any enemy of our organization and fail to kill him, may this oath kill
me,” and “If I reveal this oath to any European, may this oath kill me.”32 This last pledge might
explain why we know so little of the details surrounding the vows themselves. The ceremony
would include the slaughter of a goat and a ceremonial bite from its flesh.33 Reports of these
practices were perverted by some English who sought to demonize the Kenyans to the British
people. Candour, a conservative publication in England, reported the ceremony as comprising of
bestial and cannibalistic acts with vows that included cannibalizing their enemies and sharing
their wives with their fellow Mau Mau.34 No historical record supports such obviously
inflammatory speech, yet examining other publications of the time show anti-Kenyan sentiment
remained strong until after the events of Hola camp became public knowledge. Hola camp
gained its notoriety as only those Mau Mau who would not renounce their oath were sent there.
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Mainstream media outlets, such as The Daily Mirror, ran articles refuting the
governments’ propaganda with articles reporting on the brutality of colonial subjugation while
legitimizing colonial efforts by referring to the Kenyans as “beastly” and “savage.” 35
Eventually, European clergy joined with Labour Party representatives and the African press to
publicly denounce British colonial crimes. By 1952, however, public opinion had been
fundamentally influenced by ceaseless government propaganda efforts which delivered
increasingly horrific disinformation concerning the nature of the Kenyan people. 36
Britain’s decision to label the rebels as terrorists by not recognizing the KAU as a
legitimate political entity enabled colonists to treat all Africans as insurgents and, as such, a
threat to their personal safety and British property. These colonial farmers, many of whom had
military backgrounds, had been battling the Kenyans for years; they understood the terrain and
knew the region as well as the natives they ousted. The British government capitalized on the
idea the colonists were “kith and kin”, turning public sympathy if favor of the colonists while
further entrenching the idea of Kenyan savagery in the public mind. 37 The government also
argued that the Kenyan people could not be “considered civilized nor a possess a legitimate
political center” if local “farmers” were able to subdue the insurgents. 38 In the face of this
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propaganda, the African demands for self-rule were met with incredulity and open scorn in the
metropole. However, some politicians drew the connection between the colonial farmers in
Kenya and the bloody, costly conflict fought by the Boers. Furthermore, the British government
was keeping close watch on the economically and politically disastrous rebellions in colonial
French Algeria.
The Mau Mau defined success as survival against the vast martial resources of the British
Empire and, by that definition, they were successful. Guerilla action had greatly subsided by
1955 and Britain recalled a significant portion of troops, artillery and armored cars against the
advice of Lt. General Lathbury—who recommended the British army remain in Kenya—under
the authority of the War office, as colonial forces had proven ineffective at coping with the
insurrection. 39 Lathbury, many of the colonists, and some key figures in government now
operated under fearful speculation that a resurgence in violence was inevitable as a result of the
military withdrawal. Parliament now feared any public disturbance or demonstration in Kenya to
be a product of the Mau Mau. This put enormous pressure on Kenyan Colonial Governor Sir
Evelyn Baring (1952-59) to maintain the appearance of peaceful coexistence. Where previously
civil disobedience had been swiftly and brutally quelled by the British army, the colonial
governor now gave in to minor demands from the native public rather than risk reigniting the
guerrilla warfare. Alan Lennox-Boyd, Secretary of State for the Colonies from 1954-59, was
concerned the growing civil discontent was “strikingly reminiscent” to the atmosphere in Kenya
directly before the “Mau Mau rebellion.” This marked the first time a public official recognized
the violence as a rebellion rather than terrorist activity. The climate of anxiety was fueled by
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fears of further violence in Kenya, but policy makers were also beginning to fear a socio-political
nightmare should hostilities resume. 40
The source of this anxiety was due, in part, to a secret labor camp created to house the
most radicalized of the Mau Mau; the colonial government determined these prisoners high risk
as they would not recant the Mau Mau oath. The Hola detention camp was one of hundreds built
during the insurgency but was known to the Kenyan population for its daily use of torture,
castration, starvation, and other abuses as punishments. On March 3, 1959, the Home Office’s
fears were realized as colonial police massacred eleven inmates at Hola. In an act of defiance,
eighty-eight detainees dropped to the ground and refused to work on the basis they were political
prisoners and not subject to work detail. 41 Guards threw the prisoners into a ditch and beat the
defenseless men until the soldiers “were too tired to continue.” 42 Time Magazine reported the
massacre as described by doctors from the Red cross who were on humanitarian duties in the
camp. 43 International opinion condemned the murders while the British public demanded an
immediate investigation. For its part, the British government distanced itself from colonial
affairs and left the colonial governor to handle the crisis. The colonial Governor in Britain
renamed the camp Galole while Kenyan Colonial Governor Baring destroyed any documents that
may have embarrassed himself or the British government. When asked why he destroyed such
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crucial evidence, he indicated he simply had no room for storage. 44 With the investigation thus
stymied, no prosecution was possible although the camp was eventually shut down in the wake
of harsh public and international criticism.
In an effort to re-establish a relative peace in the colony, the British farmers agreed to
allow Kenyans their own colonial representation. However, the British government—
embarrassed by Hola and concerned with maintaining the appearance of imperial strength and
stability—refused their notions of “settler diplomacy.” The British colonial government, in their
effort to diffuse the negative publicity, would regard every Kenyan lobby, boycott or
demonstration, every organization or parade as a potential for Mau Mau activity. Kenyan
nationalism was on the rise and the Colonial forces regarded all Kenyans as Mau Mau whereas
before they distinguished between insurgent and civilian. It was at this point of heightened
anxiety that Prime Minister Harold Macmillan (1957-63) stated he was reluctant to continue
colonial rule of Kenya “because of the Mau Mau and all that.” 45 Since 1956 and the end of the
guerilla war, little organized violence was seen from the Mau Mau and yet four years later, the
threat of a resurgence dictated political discussion in parliament.46 Lennox-Boyd argued for a
multicultural Kenya, governed by the British colonial office, while other members of parliament
desired more military reprisals, even though the realistic consideration of Kenyan violence was
negligible. After the horror of Hola camp, however, the “radicalized” Mau Mau had moved from
violent opposition to a more political agenda. They rejected a multicultural Kenya and
demanded self-rule. The extreme methods Britain used to defeat the Mau Mau galvanized the
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Kenyans into a politically savvy, nationalistic, unified political entity. The shared cultural
experiences from the Great War and decades of foreign occupation instilled a desire for selfreliance, civil liberties and political autonomy. The success of the revolutions and the outrage at
Hola camp gave them strength and purpose.
In an astounding, almost willful, lack of comprehension of the political fervor in the
colony, Hola camp Commandant G.M. Sullivan adopted the “Cowan Plan.”47 Still fearing an
international political disaster, the colonial government sent more Kikuyu to prison camps,
forcing Gavaghan, now the Camp Superintendent, to find new methods of controlling the
growing numbers of prisoners. The plan, defined as “rehabilitation through work,” was
implemented by working prisoners so hard they were too tired to resist. Cowen instructed
Sullivan to work the inmates with little food or rest and if they resisted “They would be
manhandled to the site of work and forced to carry out the task.” 48 The Chief of the Colonial
Police, Colonel Arthur Young, who had fought during the revolution, found conditions so
repugnant he repeatedly and formally made complaints to Governor Baring concerning the
“revolting crimes” against the prisoner populations. 49 What Young could not have known was
that Gavaghan had received explicit approval from Lennox-Boyd to treat the prisoners “the
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rough way.” 50 Baring, who expressed his concerns, was also assured by Lennox-Boyd that
“London stands by Gavaghan and his methods.” 51
As the Office for Colonial Affairs still refused to acknowledge the political motivations
of the Kenyans, they were unwilling to negotiate or compromise with the native peoples. The
Kenyan people were aware the camps were employing brutal tactics in their efforts to
“rehabilitate,” including genital mutilation and rape. 52 Ironically, the British colonial authorities
were further radicalizing Kenyans with oppressive policies meant to subdue them. More
Kenyans were taking the Mau Mau pledge now than during the rebellion, and yet Gavaghan
continued the brutality within the camps with the full consent of London. There is no direct
evidence that Britain even considered Kenyan independence at this time. Shifting global power
and the fear of bad press on the international scene pushed the British to accept this process as
inevitable.

Global Geopolitics
By the end of 1959, the importance of Kenya had grown beyond agriculture and
exploitation, becoming Britain’s last stronghold in Africa which now boasted a strategic military
base. The international community had begun expressing anti-colonial sentiment that spiked
anxiety in Britain as another outbreak of violence in Kenya would bring severe political pressure.
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Britain stated it would continue the “peaceful” development of Kenya while fearing the United
States-led United Nations could cost them their hold in Africa. 53 McMillan had intelligence
reports from the Colonial Office as early as 1957 that warned British absence from East Africa
would result in “greater Soviet intrusion in the area.”54 Any further military action against the
Mau Mau could cost Britain their friendly standing with the West. Even a relatively minor
incident could convince Western powers that Britain was continuing to promote white
supremacy in underdeveloped nations. The United States, whose “opinion was always critical,”
was especially concerned with the political situation in Kenya as the possibility of Mau Mau
looking to the Soviet Union for support was very real. 55 International concerns and pressure
from the U.N. compounded anxieties that further rebellion would cost the British prestige, votes
and colonial resources.
These anxieties were realized in 1961 as American President John F. Kennedy addressed
the United Nations. Kennedy expressed sympathy for the Kenyan peoples and their desire for
self-rule. British officials were more certain than ever that Mau Mau activity would bring U.S.
pressure against their rapidly dwindling imperial possessions. 56 The British Empire had already
suffered an embarrassing political defeat in 1956 to the United States. Britain and France had
invaded Egypt with the intent of controlling the Suez Canal but were forced to withdraw due to
U.S. and Soviet pressure. Britain was forced to recognize their influence was waning and
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became desperate to keep both colonial power as well as international influence. Decolonization
became a central issue to Parliament in response to unfounded feelings of anxiety that a Mau
Mau resurgence would create a negative effect on their special overseas relationships as “post
war debt forced Britain to play second fiddle to the anti-imperial United States in the cold
war.”57 The reality was that the Mau Mau, as a militant organization, had been silent for half a
decade.
The United States was promoting its own agenda to create a unified African bloc capable
of withstanding communist ideology. 58 France and Germany, who were economically
surpassing the struggling United Kingdom, were also developing their relationship with the
United States, this put further pressure on Britain to improve their own relationship with the
American government. Britain sought to maintain the global appearance of a liberal democratic
and modern power while continuing to promote pro-white policy in the colonies. The fear of
their imperial legacies overshadowing the multi-cultural persona they maintained and weakening
their status with the U.S. brought de-colonization one step closer to realization. Pressured by
Labour Party rhetoric of “one man, one vote” democracy, Lord Home of the Commonwealth
Relations Office argued Britain must grant independence to Kenya by 1969. 59 More
conservative recommendations suggested a twenty-year withdrawal. The decision was no longer
whether or not to de-colonize Kenya, but rather when decolonization would occur.
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Prime Minister Macmillan considered protecting the special relationship with the U.S.
during the Cold War era as far more practical than retaining a questionably profitable Kenyan
colony. 60 His policies reflect an interest in international stability and political modernization that
also reflects his doubts about maintaining any imperial possessions. Upon his election,
Macmillan represented the third consecutive, conservative P.M. and would be succeeded by a
fourth. Exempting the post war years of Clement Attlee (1945-51), Britain had maintained
conservative leadership for thirty years. Macmillan faced fierce opposition from the Kenyan
settlers who had assumed the role of elite “aristocrats” in their rule of Kenya. 61 He had no
doubts about the catastrophic economic sanctions the U.S. could bring to bear nor the power of
his own constituency when roused, as he had seen both in action after the humiliating resolution
of the 1956 Suez Crisis. 62 Macmillan and Lennox-Boyd both concluded that any colonial
instability would severely jeopardize their political standing, internationally as well as at home,
and could negatively impact the economic and political power of Britain on a global scale.
With the specter of the Hola massacre still in the public mind, African leaders began a
campaign across European universities inspiring students and members of academia to condemn
British foreign rule. 63 Firsthand accounts of the horrors of Hola camp created new interest in
investigating the potential government cover up. Newly radicalized Britons cast severe doubts
on the multiracial ideology the British government portrayed. The very repression used to
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maintain the fiction of a peaceful Kenya was a driving force behind the abrupt change in public
opinion about maintaining the Kenyan colony.
There can be no doubt that British law makers chafed against American intrusion as “the
United States never took a kindly view to Britain’s possession of a colonial empire” and, as such,
“were not averse to interfering in Kenya.”64 Further, although the American government
propagandized their support of colonial subjects, they financially supported freed colonies to
“induce loyalty against communist intrusion.”65 Historian Max Beloff, who discusses the
“catastrophe of decolonization,” wonders how the global community supported American
pressures against colonialism while the U.S. was, itself, a colonial empire which subscribed to
the “Monroe Doctrine”, had a lengthy and bloody history in the Caribbean, and were arguably
the “dominant, albeit informal, imperial power.”66
In February of 1960, Macmillan gave his famous “Wind of Change” electoral speech in
which he argued for radical change in Kenya and hinted that democracy might be an option. 67
Macmillan feared that an overly quick withdrawal would spur settlers to violent action to
maintain their colonial status while too slow an evacuation might convince the Mau Mau to
resurface in violent rebellion. 68 Whether due to it being an election year or true sympathy for
Kenya, Macmillan had replaced Lennox-Boyd with the anti-colonial Iain Macleod (1959-61).
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Macleod immediately initiated a moderately paced four-year withdrawal from Kenya. Macleod
thought this timetable quick enough to pacify the Mau Mau, yet slow enough to allow the
European settlers to sell their properties and conclude any business in Africa. 69 Being a relative
newcomer to colonial politics, Macleod recognized that unfounded anxieties about the Mau Mau
had dictated Kenyan policy for too long. Although, he understood the socio-political
ramifications of an aggressive resurgence, no militant action nor sign of remilitarization had been
seen in years; thus, Macleod approached the Kenyan withdrawal from a humanitarian
perspective rather than a militant one. 70 To Parliament, Macleod’s apparent lack of political
concern combined with his inexperience greatly heightened their anxiety of political
repercussion and he was replaced in late 1961. What Macleod failed to grasp was that
Parliament feared any social development that was not controlled by Western powers and that
mirrored Western structure would be perceived by the U.S. as Marxist Leninist strategies.71 He
was replaced by Reginald Maulding who, perhaps seeing political opportunity, convinced
parliament that a slower withdrawal would be tolerated by the international community.
Furthermore, his racially-driven speech fed into parliamentary fears of a Mau Mau revitalization
and exploited the idea that continued tribalism made the Kenyans incapable of self-rule; the most
he would concede was a coalition government. 72 Once more, British legislation was being
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dictated by fear of further insurgent activities whose possibility existed only in government
propaganda.
Frustrated by broken promises, and perhaps sensing the dissension in Parliament, the
Kenyan people staged several large nationalistic demonstrations. In 1962, Parliament wrote the
London Agreement in which Kenya gained parliamentary representation and, as a result, Jomo
Kenyatta was reinstated as leader of the Kanu-Kadu government, serving as Kenya’s first
president from 1962-78. Kenya officially joined the Commonwealth–a British-led
intergovernmental organization of free states–in 1963, with Kenyatta serving as the first Prime
Minister. As the London Agreement was not universally accepted, the Kenyans bought out the
lands owned by the white settlers to protect themselves from further violence. 73 In 1964, Kenya
became a free Republic.

Conclusion
The power of the Mau Mau was not in their military might but the legacy of fear they
instilled in both the colonial government and that of the metropole. The struggles and
deprivations visited upon the Kenyans at the hand of British farmers and soldiers swayed a
public subject to decades of government and social propaganda that painted the Kenyans as
vicious savages. After the events at Hola, both colonial and British governors recognized the
socio-political implications that full public knowledge of the camp conditions might cause. The
constant state of political anxiety convinced the British Prime Minister that the benefit to cost
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ratio of keeping the Kenyan colony was not worth the risk of jeopardizing the U.K.’s “special
relationship” with the United States. 74 The Mau Mau were not successful against the British
military in a classic sense. Rather, the nationalistic sensibilities learned under the heavy hand of
British oppression united the myriad tribes of Kenya into a powerful, unified, political
movement. The trend toward nationalism was distinct from the military aim of the freedom
fighters, and yet to the British Parliament, they were synonymous. The unified Kenyans were a
threat to the stability of the colony as well as to the socioeconomic stability and prestige of the
British in the global community. Though the fear was misplaced, and Kenyan involvement
misunderstood, the anxiety surrounding the Mau Mau shaped British policy that would
contribute to the end of British colonial power in Africa by 1980.

Epilogue
Class and ethnic struggles marked post-colonial Kenya as nationalism gave way to
tribalism in the abrupt shift into self-rule. Kenyatta remained President of Kenya and maintained
relative stability in the nation until his death in 1978. The power vacuum led to violence as
factions vied for power. The Garissa and Wagalla Massacres of 1980 and 1984 were both ethnic
in origin, while the attempted coup by the Kenyan Air Force in 1982 was a desperate plea for
international assistance that set the Kenyan army against friends and family who served in the air
force.75 In 2001, Kenyan politics stabilized under a coalition government between two of the
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largest parties. The National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) was led by Kwai Kubaki until 2013,
when Uhuru Kenyatta, son of Jomo Kenyatta took office; he still serves as President.
Today, the specter of colonial abuses continues to haunt the British government. In 2009,
based on the research of Caroline Elkins and others, five Kenyan survivors of Hola detention
camp sued the British government for restitution for colonial abuses.76 The subsequent court
proceedings were a litany of abuses by colonial authorities. Prosecutors presented evidence of
sodomy, rape, castration and murder. Telegrams between Lennox-Boyd and the colonial
government detailed the burning of inmates alive as well as castrations, the breaking of bones
and other abuses.77 The claimants in this case all suffered severe physical trauma. Although, the
current administration rejects liability for the crimes of the colonial government, enough
evidence of parliamentary knowledge and complicity in the events led to the settlement of a
shared twenty million pounds to over five thousand Kenyans. 78
In 2011, Caroline Elkins tracked down thousands of documents in the British National
archives that the colonial government of Kenya had attempted to destroy, unaware duplicates
were being preserved by other departments. 79 These documents corroborate many of the claims
made by Hola prisoners. The telegrams, court records and correspondences sparked a second
class action lawsuit for Kenyans who survived the British occupation, suffering emotional but
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not physical abuse. 80 Certain communiques prove, incontrovertibly, that in 1961, Macleod, in
order to distance the government from colonial abuses, initiated Operation Legacy, which
ordered colonial representatives to destroy over eight thousand documents concerning any
evidence of wrongdoing or racial prejudice. 81 These documents proved vital in confirming the
complicity of the British government in colonial atrocities. The politically embarrassing episode
will haunt the British administration for the foreseeable future. The lawsuit is expected to last
until 2017.
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